Research

I study how embedded and IoT systems fail under attack and how to make them fail less. That work runs from the memory errors in device firmware, through the botnets built from those errors and the traffic they leave on the network, to learning-based defenses that stay trustworthy once they are deployed. It rests on experiments at realistic scale: testbeds and emulators that reproduce an attack end to end before a detection method is judged against it. Recent work extends the same approach to drones and other cyber-physical platforms at the firmware, software, system, and network levels.

Research interests: Cybersecurity; Internet of Things (IoT) software and network security; Software assurance; Dependable and secure systems; Secure software engineering; Botnet experimentation; Trustworthy AI for cyber defense.

Firmware and software security

This line of work starts from memory errors in device firmware and follows one such error from discovery to defense: a memory corruption vulnerability in Connman, a connection manager used on IoT devices (DSN 2019); a short survey of control-hijacking vulnerabilities across IoT firmware (IoTSec 2018); and the question of how a single bug becomes a botnet at scale (DSN 2023). On the defensive side, DAEDALUS applies stochastic software diversity against firmware ROP exploits (arXiv preprint, 2024), and an earlier work-in-progress paper (ACSAC 2020) framed the same idea for large-scale memory exploits in IoT devices. Jadeite (Computers & Security 2022) turns to malware detection, combining image and behavior representations of Java programs.

  • memory corruption
  • control-flow hijacking
  • return-oriented programming
  • software diversity
  • firmware analysis
  • malware detection

Papers in this area

Current directions. Software diversity as a deployable defense for firmware, following the DAEDALUS preprint, and its evaluation against realistic exploit chains.

IoT networks and attack experimentation

Several projects built the attack before studying detection. DDoSim, a simulation testbed that runs real binaries in Docker containers over an NS-3 network, created a large-scale memory-error IoT botnet (DSN 2023). DDoSimQ moved DDoS attack simulation from DDoSim onto full-system emulation (CPSIoTSec 2023), and DDoShield-IoT is a testbed for simulating IoT botnet DDoS attacks with lightweight detection alongside them (DSN-W 2024). A poster on exploit delivery to consumer IoT devices with a WiFi Pineapple (SPW 2019) covers the delivery side. The network foundations go back to completing the IEEE 802.11e implementation in NS-3 (ICICS 2016) and to cloud-supported wireless video surveillance systems (2017 and 2018).

  • IoT botnets
  • DDoS
  • network emulation
  • NS-3
  • Docker
  • testbeds
  • intrusion detection

Papers in this area

Current directions. Continuous, real-time detection of malicious traffic across multiple network environments (Multi-LF, under review).

Trustworthy AI for cyber defense

Learning-based detection has to survive contact with real networks: devices differ, labels are scarce, and the hardware is small. Recent papers take these constraints one at a time. A device-centric and temporal learning framework targets malicious IoT traffic (ICSC 2025); a single autoencoder targets anomaly detection in next-generation networks (GLOBECOM 2025); few-shot retrieval-augmented LLMs (CANS 2025), minimalist LLMs built with quantization and low-rank adaptation (ICAIT 2025), and lightweight fine-tuning for explainable intrusion detection in SDN (WiMob 2025) ask how much model is actually needed. Federated image-based detection runs in real time across participants (DSN-W 2026), and side-channel information from the device serves as a second signal alongside network traffic (DCAS 2026, DSN-S 2026 poster). Adjacent work applies the same tools to security operations (SecLM SOC Copilot poster, 2026) and to multimodal fake news detection (Journal of Big Data 2025).

  • network intrusion detection
  • side-channel analysis
  • federated learning
  • large language models
  • anomaly detection
  • domain adaptation
  • explainability

Papers in this area

Current directions. Unsupervised domain adaptation for deployable intrusion detection and hierarchical side-channel detection of IoT botnet attacks (both under review).

Embedded systems and drone cybersecurity

The newest line of work, and the focus of the Fall 2027 Ph.D. opening, carries the firmware, side-channel, and network methods above onto embedded and cyber-physical platforms, including drones. The aim is security at every level at which a drone can be attacked: the firmware it boots, the software it runs, the system it controls, and the network it talks over. No publication specific to this line exists yet; the closest published work is listed below.

  • cyber-physical systems
  • drones
  • embedded firmware
  • side channels
  • system security

Closest published work

Current directions. Drone cybersecurity at the firmware, software, system, and network levels, as described in the Fall 2027 Ph.D. call.

Software and testbeds

Systems built for the papers. Each card links to the paper that describes the system.

  • Simulation testbed

    DDoSim

    A simulation testbed for large-scale botnet DDoS attacks: real binaries run in Docker containers over a simulated NS-3 network, validated against hardware experiments and used to build a memory-error IoT botnet.

    Papers: DSN 2023, CPSIoTSec 2023

  • Simulation and emulation tool

    DDoSimQ

    Extends DDoSim with full-system emulation.

    Papers: CPSIoTSec 2023

  • Testbed

    DDoShield-IoT

    A testbed for simulating IoT botnet DDoS attacks and evaluating lightweight detection alongside them.

    Papers: DSN-W 2024

  • Defense prototype

    DAEDALUS

    A defense against firmware return-oriented programming (ROP) exploits that uses stochastic software diversity.

    Papers: arXiv 2024, ACSAC 2020

Where to start

The Research Explorer arranges 15 of the 32 entries into 4 guided reading paths and Working with me lists the papers to read first.